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I am delighted to speak to you about stewardship and sustainability in agriculture, es-
pecially as they relate to the element of international trade. The Office of the US Trade 
Representative (USTR) is a small government agency. We are responsible within the Ex-
ecutive Office of the President for developing the government’s trade policy, negotiating 
trade agreements, and enforcing trade agreements.
Sustainability is like a stool with three legs, the environmental, social, and economic, 
and too often the economic leg gets left behind. And even when they are investigated, 
the economics of trade in the products of agricultural biotechnology are not always fully 
incorporated. A part of the job that I do every day is to help the US government, our ag 
stakeholders, and Congress understand the trade impacts of domestic issues and regula-
tions such as insect resistance, herbicide resistance, because we have to take those into 
account for international trade. It is critical that we consider international trade impacts 
of new products coming to market and consider their stewardship necessary.
Opening and maintaining markets for US agricultural products, including those de-
rived from agricultural biotechnology, is a top priority for the US government. We have 
a multi-agency, interagency process that works on these goals; USTR, USDA, the State 
Department, and all the US regulatory agencies cooperate in these efforts and coordinate 
to make sure that the use and trade of biotechnology products help US farmers compete 
in the global marketplace and help make US agriculture more sustainable.
With over $40 billion in US exports of food and agriculture products, and that is just 
under 25% of our total agricultural exports, derived from biotechnology, and over 90% 
of all US corn, cotton, soybeans, and sugar beets, not to mention large percentages of 
papaya and alfalfa, as well, our and other countries’ regulatory approaches to biotechnol-
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ogy are critical components of our trade agenda. So for today what I want to do is lay a 
foundation for discussions you will have for the next day and a half.
By way of background, 28 countries already are growing biotech crops—an estimated 
18,000,000 farmers—and more countries are going to be added. I recently met with 
representatives of Vietnam, which is now conducting field trials and has new regulations 
in place. Adoption rates globally for the main commodities are high: 82% of soybeans are 
biotech, 68% of cotton, 30% of corn, 25% of canola. The growth over the last 20 years 
has been phenomenal, particularly for soybeans and to a lesser extent corn. And it is not 
just the United States. In 2012 developing countries surpassed developed countries in 
planted acreage. So what does that mean for trade? Some have calculated the percentage 
of local trade times the major biotech crops. For soybeans, nearly 100% of global trade 
is biotech, for corn and cotton it is about 70%, and canola is over 80%.  
Keeping all that in mind, let us add in some additional complications and look at it 
in a slightly different way. I want to show you how trade has changed over the past 40 
years. In the 1970s, regional trade agreements were originally primarily focused in South 
America and Europe. In 1995, which is right about when biotech was being cultivated 
and started to be traded, there is a substantially increased amount of regional trade agree-
ments, but they were still within a region, within the Western Hemisphere—in Europe, 
Africa, and South America. By 2014, however, these regional trade agreements had crossed 
regions and become global.
Now let us look at the United States more specifically.  We exported about $10.6 billion 
worth of corn to 71 different countries in 2014. That does not include any products 
made with corn, such as high-fructose corn syrup, just straight feed corn. And 93% of 
that corn is biotech. In the case of soybeans, including soybean meal and oil, we export 
about $30.5 billion to 110 different countries, of which 94% is biotech. In the case of 
cotton it is about $4.4 billion worth of exports to 68 different countries. That is 93% of 
our production and it is biotech.
When you add in the complications of what is coming down the road, it is no longer 
just herbicide tolerance and insect resistance. There is drought tolerance, higher yield, 
nitrogen use efficiency, insect resistance, and all the stacked combinations being developed. 
In the pipeline of products for soybeans there are feed efficiency, new oil profiles, disease 
resistance, and drought resistance. 
With all those complexities, all those new products, the vast expanse of our trade obvi-
ously makes us a little concerned about what the future holds for trade issues. I will focus 
on some of our current issues on trade within the US government.  
1. First, there is the lack of science-based regulation, particularly in developing 
countries. Peru, Kenya, India, Turkey are all major export markets for us. In these 
countries, our export markets don’t have science-based regulations, and if those 
regulations don’t function, it is obviously hard to get products authorized, which 
puts our exports at risk.
2. There is a second category of regulations that we call “asynchronous authoriza-
tions.” By this we mean that different countries take different periods of time to 
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review and authorize the cultivation and import of new products or events. The 
poster child for asynchronous authorizations is China. China will not accept a 
dossier for consideration until after a product is already authorized in the country 
of export. We haven’t quite figured out what that means for stacked products yet, 
since we don’t always have authorizations here in the United States for stacks, 
depending on what the different events are. That means that China already has 
at least a three-year delay in their system for approving new products, products 
that US farmers could grow before they could be legally exported to China. The 
implications of this asynchrony are enormous and result in high risk, particularly 
as experienced last year by our corn growers and traders.  
— I want to start first on the soybean side, because half of US soybean exports 
go to China. US soybean farmers are very careful about what biotech products 
they plant here and make sure that China has approved those new products 
before they are cultivated in the United States. But that means that our farm-
ers are losing out on the benefit of new technology if they are having to wait 
four, five, seven, eight, nine years for new weed control mechanisms.  
 — In the case of corn, US corn exports to China, until recently, were not terribly 
significant. In 2008 they were under a million dollars. That is not a lot in our 
ag trade world. So farmers and traders took the risk of exporting corn. Then 
China decided they needed more corn and they bought a lot of corn from us, 
reaching over about $1.3 billion in 2012.  China wanted the corn so much 
that they ignored the fact that maybe some of those new corn events weren’t 
approved yet in China. Then in 2014, China decided they didn’t want our 
corn anymore, that they had enough. And lo and behold, their inspection 
authorities found some events that were not authorized in China yet, and that 
resulted in a $3 billion disruption in US exports to China.  
3. The third area is what we call “low-level presence.” LLP can happen when an 
event is approved in a country of export but not yet in the country of import. 
This low-level presence will occur particularly in cases of asynchronous authoriza-
tion. So there is a connection between the two. In 2008, the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission issued guidance on who would do food safety assessments for LLP 
situations. All three of our US regulatory agencies also already have policies in 
place for LLPs. But there is a lot of work going on right now, domestically as well 
as globally, to consider LLP, and Dr. Michael Schechtman will be discussing that 
in more detail tomorrow.  
4. The fourth area is labeling. The US takes a science-based approach to mandatory 
labeling for biotech products. Here it is in simple terms: If the GE product is 
compositionally different from the conventional product, then the FDA requires 
that the difference must be on the label. However, other countries require labeling 
even if there is no difference in the product. And some countries, such as EU 
members, require labeling even if there is no novel protein left in a food product 
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because of the way it is processed. The prime example of trade disruptions result-
ing from labeling came in around 2000, when the EU imposed labeling and 
significantly cut off our soybean oil exports. Because European food companies 
were afraid of boycotts, they decided to source soybeans from non-GE countries.
5. The fifth example is a little bit more limited. In order for some countries to do the 
scientific reviews, they require that the technology developers do field trials in the 
country.  China, again, is the example.  If field trial permits are not granted, and 
currently China is not making those decisions in a timely manner, that means the 
technology developers can’t get the science together in order to get authorizations.
6. Another issue we deal with is liability, and here the poster child is Turkey, where 
the liability is so severe for unapproved events or missed information from the 
technology developer that US technology developers aren’t even submitting dos-
siers for approval in Turkey. Again, that disrupts our exports of corn, soybean, or 
cotton if we can’t get these products authorized in the countries of export.
7. And then finally I must talk about the latest proposal from the European 
Union—what they call an opt-out provision—whereby even if the European 
Commission has determined that a particular event is perfectly safe, member 
states can decide on their own not to allow that particular event to be used in 
their country. This proposal undermines the common market of the European 
Union, and we fail to understand how a product that is determined to be safe 
by the European Commission cannot be allowed in individual countries. This is 
very important for Europe’s livestock producers, who rely on biotech corn and 
soybeans for animal feed.
The US government focuses on opening up markets to US exports. In the case of 
biotechnology, we focus on promoting science-based and timely regulatory decisions. 
We do this in a number of different ways, what we call the sustained working level. This 
involves primarily the regulatory agencies and USDA’s foreign agricultural service. For 
example, they will work to release individual shipments that have been held or work with 
individual countries to make sure that regulations are science based as they are being 
developed. In another area we work bilaterally with countries. That is often focused, as 
in the case of China, on starting a dialog on scientific innovation. One of our objectives 
is to work with China to help promote science-based regulatory decision making. 
We also work with groups of countries “plural-laterally,” where several organizations, 
including USDA, provide leadership in promoting, again, science-based regulatory ap-
proaches. We have what we call our Like-Minded Group, which we established in 2010. 
These are countries that also produce biotechnology, and we work together primarily 
in Brussels to raise concerns about European approaches and concerns, whether it is on 
opt-out or other issues. 
A group that was initiated by Canada, Global LLP Initiative, is a slightly larger group 
of 15 countries that focuses on developing coordinated approaches to LLP. The USDA 
provides leadership in both North and South America within governments to promote 
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science-based decision making. Within APEC, the Asia Pacific Economic Corporation, 
there is a high-level policy dialog for agricultural biotechnology focused on information 
exchange and consensus building in the Asian Pacific region.
Multilaterally—with other World Trade Organization members—we routinely raise 
concerns with other countries on sanitary and phytosanitary measures: food safety, animal 
health, and plant health. We also have a committee on technical barriers to trade, essen-
tially regulations, that are not related to sanitary and phytosanitary issues. And within 
the Codex Alimentarius the US government has dealt with various biotechnology issues 
over the years, including having decades-long conversations about labeling, LLP, and how 
to do food safety risk assessments.
We talk about biotechnology in trade agreement negotiations, most recently the Trans-
Pacific Partnership negotiations with its 12 countries, under Canada’s leadership. There 
is work to try to create a forum within TPP for information exchange and collaboration 
on LLP and asynchronous authorizations.
And finally, in the area of trade and technical capacity building, USDA has many proj-
ects working with third-world countries to help them develop sound regulatory systems. 
AID and the State Department do a lot of outreach as well.
So what is the future, and what are the key items I would like you to think about over 
the next day and a half? We have many current challenges associated with ag-biotech 
products, but they are not limited to the use of genetic engineering or recombinant DNA 
technology. We have new types of biotechnologies that are already here, some of which 
are referred to as new breeding techniques, including novel approaches such as genome 
editing, but there is no clear picture of how these new technologies will be regulated here 
in the United States or around the world. Scientific advances will continue to provide 
tools to improve crop varieties more precisely and more quickly, and they can help us 
address the suite of sustainability challenges confronting agriculture around the world. 
Engagements on emerging technologies will hopefully help create enabling policy environ-
ments for innovation and allow products from those innovations to be used and traded 
globally in a reliable manner. Farmers and businesses need predictability and certainty in 
the regulatory processes of other countries, and that is a need with which the US govern-
ment can help. But the US and Canadian governments can’t do it all, which opens the 
door for you to discuss later today and tomorrow the importance of stewardship on the 
part of technology developers to help facilitate trade for American farmers. Key to that 
responsible stewardship is ensuring that products are authorized in key export markets 
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Q&A
G. Thompson, Penn State: How much of the embargoes that are slowing things down 
by the various mechanisms you described might be due to market manipulation as well? 
Lauritsen: I think that is certainly the case with China. Obviously it is a very central-
ized government. They very much control how much of which particular product they 
import. So I would say that is certainly the case with China, but less so in less centrally 
planned governments.  
S. Pueppke, Michigan State University: You paint a complex picture of trade and I wonder 
if this is just the way it is in general or if there is something about food and biotechnology 
that is different from other items that might be traded?
Lauritsen: I wouldn’t say that agricultural biotechnology is unique, but that as new tech-
nologies are introduced within agriculture, there is a shared complexity, and whether it is 
agricultural biotechnology or new animal drugs, there is a range of things that our farm-
ers, ranchers, and food processors use that other countries don’t or don’t have processes 
to authorize, and that creates problems. My office, and particularly the USTR, spend a 
tremendous amount of resources trying to deal with trade created by a whole host of new 
technologies. One of the reasons our approach to China last year was focused broadly on 
innovation in agriculture was that, on the road to the future as we see it, this is something 
that is going to grow with the introduction of new technologies.
R. Hardy, NABC: About ten years ago, we were very concerned about field testing of ge-
netically modified crops, especially in the university setting. NABC at that time published 
a document on best management practices. It seems to me what we are talking about here 
is best management practices for farming. The National Research Council periodically 
does studies of standards, etc. Might we not fund a National Research Council study, 
maybe every five years, to investigate best management practices for producing crops?
Lauritsen: I’m a big fan of best management practices and I certainly think there is a 
role for such a study, whether it is on coexistence or trade. How to get that out to the 
hundreds of thousands of farmers is a question. There is also a role for best practices 
within the technology developer community, particularly in regard to stewardship. All 
of those would be welcome.
T. Shelton, Cornell University: Right now most of the biotechnology is involved with 
process, with grains, etc. You also mentioned papaya and a number of other crops, and 
I see this opening up to tremendous complications as we look at vegetables and fruits.  I 
recently attended a seminar where someone was talking about China and how central plan-
ning was deciding which crops to grow and which to buy on the world market. Soybeans, 
which originated in Asia, are a water-intensive crop, and someone in China said they 
are probably not going to plant much of those, because they are so water intensive, and 
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that water is needed for the population. They are planning to get away from producing 
soybeans and just buy them on the world market, in which case they probably are going 
to have to be much more flexible on the traits they will accept.  It is market demand and 
survival more than rules.
Lauritsen: That is absolutely right and that is what we saw with corn last year. When they 
decided that they had enough corn in storage, they started inspecting and testing the corn 
and found a scientific reason to stop imports. And you are right, they want soybeans and 
they are going to buy them from us and Brazil and Argentina—all of us biotech produc-
ers. One of the conversations with the Chinese last year was that they need to get their 
regulatory system functioning because US farmers may decide that they will not hold 
back on introducing a new technology and will just send their crops someplace other than 
China. I don’t know if that will happen, but there is a lot of grumbling among farmers 
who want to use new technologies, in particular crops tolerant to different herbicides. 
The soybean market is too important for us, and our farmers will take the risk right now, 
but they are certainly starting to rethink this. The other issue with China is they are 
developing their own biotechnology traits. I remember going to a scientific conference a 
few years ago, and all the Chinese in the room picked up their cameras and took pictures 
of all the slides and took them back. So you know they definitely want to develop their 
own technology—and that is one of the reasons they are slow to approve imports. They 
are trying to play catch-up.
S. Shantaram, University of Maryland of the Eastern Shore: What is your prediction 
on the opt-out in the EU?
Lauritsen: I just had a report from our office in Brussels this morning, where four major 
political parties in the European parliament requested that the commission take back 
the opt-out proposal. Those of us in government—and you will appreciate this, it tends 
to be a joke—know we are doing our job when nobody is happy. When you make both 
sides unhappy, you know you have done your job right. That’s what the commission 
did. We never thought the NGOs and the biotech industry in Europe would both agree 
that this proposal was bad. The environmentalists don’t like it, and the major European 
farm organization actually publically criticized it. A French farmer led the protest. So, 
nobody likes it, and maybe it was their intention to put out something so bad that it 
would die. We’ll see.
S. Shantaram: You know I have studied this transatlantic fight over GMOs so long here 
in the US that it is my very informal nonscientific conclusion that this whole debate is 
not about safety of the technology, but totally about international money that is being 
paid off in different arenas. How are they going to tackle this? Most of these decisions 
are not being resolved. What is the solution?
Lauritsen: I will answer that in two ways. It is purely political. If you look at surveys 
in Europe asking, “What do you look for when you buy your food?”, only 5% of the 
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respondents talk about GMOs. For most European consumers, GMOs are just not at the 
top of the list. But if you ask Europeans, “Do you care if your food is a GMO?”, most 
will say they do, or 75% will say, “Yes we care and we don’t want it.” So it is how you 
ask the question, it is politics. They have a new commission, a new president leaning in 
that direction. As the US government, we will continue to focus on science-based deci-
sion making when we meet with the European food safety agency, and the working-level 
people there are also very much focused on trying to make science-based decisions. It 
is the political overlay that causes the problems. At some point in time, European agri-
culture is not going to be competitive. Without biotech advances, without advances in 
animal growth—when you travel through France and some of the other countries, you 
realize that the farmers there are just fine not using new technologies, and our farmers 
will simply go elsewhere. Europe is no longer the big market it used to be, and we spend 
less time on European issues—at least we did before we had to start trade negotiations 
with them—since it has not been as important a market as Asia in particular.
R. Giroux, Cargill: I can’t possibly let the USTR leave without asking questions. But first 
I am going to thank Sharon for all the hard things the USTR does for us as we try to do 
trade. All markets are important to US agriculture. I’m sure that’s what you needed to 
hear. Your work helps our farmers prosper here in the United States. Competition and 
being competitive is the number one priority and should be the number one priority for 
the department, as I am sure it is. I think what you have highlighted on your slides is 
very dramatic, it shows how we merge into a global food system. Compared to 1975, in 
2015 we really have a developed global food system, and as you have noted, it is about 
integrating technology, not about innovation. We are innovating very well. There are lots 
of products. Many of them meet demands by our producers, but it is the integration step, 
the integration of those technologies into that global food system, that is the problem. 
And it is through science, it is by understanding what consumers want that we will find 
those solutions. I think the challenge in front of us, and one you highlighted very well, is 
to integrate the technology into what has become a global food system, to recognize that 
it is a global food system not only from a customer, but also from an origin perspective.
Lauritsen: Thanks Randy. And thank you.
